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GOING DUTCH: THE EFFECTS OF 
DOMESTIC RESTRICTION AND FOREIGN 
ACCEPTANCE OF CLASS LITIGATION  
ON AMERICAN SECURITIES  
FRAUD PLAINTIFFS 
Abstract: This Note examines the intersection of two recent trends in ag-
gregate litigation in the United States and Europe. In the United States, 
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have significantly restricted the 
utility of the class action mechanism, leaving many American plaintiffs 
with legitimate claims without recourse in the United States. Simultane-
ously, the European Union and its Member States have considered and 
implemented new mechanisms to facilitate the resolution of mass claims. 
The Netherlands employs a particularly useful aggregate litigation system. 
As a result of these two trends, this Note argues that Americans with secu-
rities fraud claims, who find themselves shut out of American courts, 
should seek redress in the Netherlands under the Dutch Settlement Act. 
This Note posits that American courts are likely to give res judicata effect 
to such judgments, and, barring a preemptive trans-European system of 
collective redress, the Netherlands is a viable alternative to U.S. federal 
courts for resolving securities fraud claims. 
Introduction 
 Class actions in the United States began with a noble goal: to open 
the courthouse doors to groups of similarly injured plaintiffs who would 
otherwise be unable to bring claims individually.1 Using class actions, 
victims of securities fraud, employment discrimination, and consumer 
fraud could easily join together to file mass claims.2 In practice, how-
ever, class actions have been expanded beyond their original bounds 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (noting the value of the 
class action for plaintiffs with low-value claims, for whom “[e]conomic reality dictates that 
[their claims] proceed as a class action or not at all”); William B. Rubenstein, Newberg 
on Class Actions § 1:7 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining how the class action procedure en-
ables litigation); Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. L. Rev. 497, 497, 500 (1969) 
(arguing that “class actions . . . enhance the forensic opportunities of hitherto powerless 
groups”). 
2 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 811, 818 (2010) (analyzing class action settlements in 
federal courts in 2007, and finding that 35% of claims were for securities fraud, 14% were 
for labor or employment claims, and 12% were for consumer fraud). 
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and have been abused routinely by plaintiffs’ lawyers.3 As a result, dur-
ing the last decade class action critics have succeeded in dramatically 
limiting class certification.4 Unfortunately, this legislative and judicial 
tightening has left many truly aggrieved plaintiffs without relief.5 
                                                                                                                     
 Across the Atlantic, European countries have historically rejected 
American-style class actions because such claims cede the state’s regula-
tory authority to private actors.6 Nevertheless, the European Union has 
recently studied and proposed a trans-European system for aggregate 
litigation.7 Moreover, many EU Member States have independently 
 
 
3 See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14–20 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–21 (Senate 
Report on the Class Action Fairness Act) (describing plaintiffs’ lawyers’ abuse of the contin-
gency fee model); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 71, 73 (“[T]he modern 
class action has undermined the foundational precepts of American democracy.”). 
4 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
5 See, e.g., id. (expanding federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction over class actions); Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (denying class certification in an 
employment discrimination case due to lack of commonality); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (dismissing a plaintiff class’s legitimate consumer 
fraud claim due to contractual class action waiver); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 
S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (prohibiting class adjudication of securities fraud claims related to 
securities listed on foreign exchanges); infra notes 69–114 and accompanying text. 
6 See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 
62 Vand. L. Rev. 179, 209 (2009) (“Both the strengths and the weaknesses of American 
collective procedures arise from the willingness to entrust a great deal of social regulation 
to private initiative and common law forms of adjudication.”). Some commentators posit 
that the class action is an efficient and powerful way to regulate corporate conduct. See, 
e.g., David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in Regulation Through 
Litigation 244, 245 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (proposing a system of mandatory class 
actions in mass tort claims, in which the threat of enormous monetary damages “provides 
would-be tortfeasors with financial incentive to invest optimally in precautions that prevent 
unreasonable risk”). Others have criticized this thesis for giving the class action decisions 
of “activist judges . . . the sweep of a legislative action,” and would instead rely on regula-
tion by the free market. See, e.g., James Wootton, Comment on The Regulatory Advantage of 
Class Action, in Regulation Through Litigation, supra, at 304, 304–08 (“There is no 
more effective regulatory device than the disaffected consumer who takes his or her busi-
ness elsewhere.”). 
7 See European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Ap-
proach to Collective Redress, P7_TA-PROV(2012)0021, PE 479.894, at 36–43 (Feb. 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter Resolution], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP 
//NONSGML+TA+20120202+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN; Parliament Committee 
on Legal Affairs Report on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress,’ at 1–30 
( Jan. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Legal Affairs Report], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0012+0+DOC+PDF+ 
V0//EN. The term “aggregate litigation” is broader than the term “class action” as conceived 
in the United States. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the 
Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2009) (“The term ‘aggregate litiga-
tion’ creates a big tent.”); see also Tanya J. Monestier, Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory 
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adopted legal mechanisms that permit private individuals to seek col-
lective redress.8 In 2005, for instance, the Netherlands enacted the 
Dutch Settlement Act, by which Dutch courts can certify out-of-court 
settlements of mass claims.9 As a result of its extensive jurisdictional 
reach, the Dutch Settlement Act holds potential for both European and 
American plaintiffs.10 
 This Note traces the trends of aggregate litigation in both the 
United States and Europe, and examines the potential benefits of the 
European market to American plaintiffs.11 Part I examines the state of 
the class action in the United States and the legislative and judicial 
tightening of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that has 
left many plaintiffs without recourse.12 Part II discusses Europe’s his-
torical rejection and recent embrace of aggregate litigation mecha-
nisms, and analyzes the state of the law in individual Member States 
and the European Union itself.13 Part III argues that, as a result of the 
trends identified in Parts I and II, American class plaintiffs with securi-
ties fraud claims who have been shut out of domestic courts should 
seek relief in Europe under the Dutch Settlement Act.14 Part III then 
considers the res judicata effect that American courts might give to for-
eign aggregate litigation judgments, and concludes that courts are most 
likely to give such effect in securities fraud cases.15 Finally, Part III ana-
lyzes the potential impact of a trans-European aggregate litigation re-
gime on American plaintiffs’ recourse in the Netherlands.16 
                                                                                                                      
Search for Res Judicata, 86 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 43 n.148 (2011) (noting that while eighteen coun-
tries have enacted some form of aggregate litigation, only six—Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Israel, Portugal, and Norway—permit “U.S.-style class action[s]”). 
8 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 21–25 (listing recent class action laws of EU Member 
States). 
9 See Wet Collectieve Afhandeling Massaschade [WCAM] [Dutch Settlement Act], codified 
in Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] bk. 7, arts. 907–10, translated in The Civil Code of 
the Netherlands 903–06 (Hans Warendorf et al. trans., Kluwer Law Int’l 2009), and Wet-
boek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [Rv] [Code of Civil Procedure] bk. 3, tit. 14, arts. 
1013–18, translated in Helene van Lith, The Dutch Collective Settlements Act and 
Private International Law 148–51 (2010), available at http://www.wodc.nl/images/ 
1817_Volledige_tekst_tcm44-303998.pdf. 
10 See id. 
11 See infra notes 17–332 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 17–114 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 115–255 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 256–305 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 285–305 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 306–332 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Evolving Standard for Class Action Certification  
in the United States 
 Courts have long accepted the class action as an integral element 
of American jurisprudence, but the standard used to evaluate class cer-
tification has not been consistent over time.17 This Part identifies three 
significant developments in the recent history of the American class 
action.18 Section A provides an overview of Rule 23, which governs class 
actions, and examines the policy considerations underpinning its crea-
tion.19 Section B notes several real and perceived abuses of the class 
action structure.20 Section C then details the judicial and legislative re-
sponse to these abuses.21 
A. The Rule 23 Class Certification Standard 
 Rule 23, which governs the procedure for class certification, was 
significantly reformulated in 1966 in response to widespread criti-
cism.22 Prior to this revision, class actions were relatively rare, due in 
large part to the rule’s ill-defined certification requirements.23 The 
1966 revision provided clarity, and remains the standard today.24 The 
revised rule permits federal courts to certify class actions if: (1) the 
proposed class is so large that joinder is impracticable; (2) the class is 
united by common questions of law or fact; (3) the representative par-
ties’ claims or defenses are typical of those of the class as a whole; and 
(4) the representatives will adequately protect the class’s interests.25 
The numerosity and commonality requirements are the two central 
attributes of the modern class action, and focus on the characteristics 
                                                                                                                      
17 See infra notes 22–114 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 22–114 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 22–37 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 38–68 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 69–114 and accompanying text. 
22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (describ-
ing criticism of the prior version); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 375–400 (1967) 
(discussing changes to Rule 23). 
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966). The previous version of Rule 23 
defined three abstract categories of class actions—true, hybrid, and spurious—which were 
based upon the rights involved. Id. In the note accompanying its revision, the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules wrote that these classifications “proved obscure and uncertain,” 
and that “[t]he courts had considerable difficulty with these terms.” Id.; see Rubenstein, 
supra note 1, § 1:15. 
24 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 497. 
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
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of the class.26 Conversely, the typicality and adequacy of representation 
prerequisites set standards for the class’s representatives.27 
 In addition to satisfying the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), parties 
e on Civil Rules (“Advisory Committee”) 
am
                                                                                                                     
seeking class certification must establish that, for one of the reasons 
defined in Rule 23(b)(1)–(3), class certification is appropriate.28 First, 
under Rule 23(b)(1), a class action may be appropriate if separate ac-
tions by class members would result in inconsistent outcomes or would 
be dispositive of the interests of other similarly situated individuals not 
party to the proceedings.29 Second, a class action may be maintained 
under Rule 23(b)(2) if the opponent of class certification has acted or 
failed to act with respect to the class such that injunctive or declaratory 
relief for the class as a whole is appropriate.30 Third, Rule 23(b)(3) 
permits a court to certify a class if common questions of law or fact 
predominate over individual questions and class adjudication is the 
fairest and most efficient means by which to proceed.31 In making this 
determination, a court may consider the class members’ interests in 
controlling separate actions, any concurrent litigation regarding the 
same controversy, the appropriateness of the forum, and any potential 
administrative difficulties.32 
 The Advisory Committe
ch pioned its revisions to Rule 23 as establishing “a ready and fair 
means of achieving unitary adjudication” for both plaintiffs and defen-
dants.33 Commentators at the time praised the amended rule for more 
 
26 See id.; Rubenstein, supra note 1, § 3:18 (“The commonality and numerosity re-
quir
ule 23(b)(3) is a significant departure from the previous version of the rule be-
caus
ory committee’s note (1966). 
ements have long been the organizing principles of aggregate litigation.”). 
27 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Rubenstein, supra note 1, § 3:28. 
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. R
e it permits an “opt-out” class action scheme. See id.; Rubenstein, supra note 1, § 1:15. 
In an opt-out system, a class action judgment binds absent class members who decline to 
opt out of the plaintiff class, rather than only those who opt in, or request inclusion. Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (“Unlike a defendant in a normal 
civil suit, an absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything.”); Rubenstein, 
supra note 1, § 1:15. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Rule 23’s 
opt-out regime in the 1985 case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 472 U.S. at 812–13 (“Requir-
ing a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably impede the prosecution of 
those class actions involving an aggregation of small individual claims, where a large num-
ber of claims are required to make it economical to bring suit.”). The Court held that con-
stitutional due process is met as long as all potential class members receive notice of the 
class action and are informed of their right to opt out. Id. 
32 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advis
1852 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1847 
clearly promoting the class action’s dual goals.34 First, by explicitly de-
lineating three categories of class actions, the amended rule considera-
bly reduced duplicative litigation of similar claims.35 Second, “even at 
the expense of increasing litigation,” Rule 23 “provide[d] means of 
vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually would be 
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”36 
This second goal was strongly rooted in the classic American jurispru-
dential concerns of due process and equal access to federal courts.37 
B. Real and Perceived Abuses of the American Class Action 
 Desp  argued ite revised Rule 23’s admirable intentions, critics have
that the class action has been stretched far beyond its appropriate limits 
and has been regularly abused by plaintiffs’ lawyers.38 One example of 
alleged rule-stretching was the introduction of the mass tort class action 
in the 1980s.39 The Advisory Committee counseled in 1966 that mass 
tort cases were not well suited for class adjudication because the ques-
tions at issue frequently affect individual class members differently.40 
                                                                                                                      
34 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 497. 
 AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart 
v. D  Harv. L. Rev. 78, 84 (2011) (“The 1966 class action 
rule
t class ac-
tion
 P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966) (“A ‘mass accident’ re-
sult dinarily not appropriate for a class action be-
cau
35 Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
36 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 497. 
37 See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on
ukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
 . . . respond[ed] to power asymmetries in civil litigation.”); id. at 91 (explaining that 
the revised rule paid homage to the phrase “equal justice under law,” which is engraved on 
the facade of the U.S. Supreme Court building and “serves as a signpost for the hopes that 
democratic orders place in courts”). But see Thomas J. Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defen-
dant’s Point of View, 10 B.C. L. Rev. 515, 518 (1969) (arguing that such a “humanitarian 
purpose . . . is enunciated nowhere in Rule 23,” and that “the (b)(3) class action device 
should not be employed, regardless of incidental salutary purposes, unless the basic goal 
of efficiency is achieved through the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation”). 
38 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1462 (1995) (writing of the “sordid” results of mass tor
s); Redish, supra note 3, at 74 (arguing that the class action was designed merely as a 
procedural device, not “a mechanism intended to serve as a roving policeman of corporate 
misdeeds . . . by which to redistribute wealth”); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts—Messy 
Ethics, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1228, 1231 (1995) (criticizing “a sizable number of [plaintiffs’] 
lawyers who are attracted to the big-money rewards of morally compromised (but legal) 
professional work”). 
39 See Coffee, supra note 38, at 1356–58. 
40 See Fed. R. Civ.
ing in injuries to numerous persons is or
se of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and 
defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”); Rich-
ard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 8 (2007) (“The drafters of 
Rule 23 in its modern form did not aspire to facilitate, much less to foment, tort litiga-
tion.”). 
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Nevertheless, some mass tort plaintiffs found class action success in the 
mid-1980s.41 In one notable case, a mass tort plaintiff class successfully 
used class certification—and the help of a creative federal judge—to 
pressure a defendant into a multi-million dollar settlement even 
though all parties recognized the plaintiffs’ claim was weak.42 This suc-
cess was short lived, however, and during the 1990s, federal courts ef-
fectively eradicated mass tort class actions from their dockets.43 
 As a result of Rule 23’s procedural limitations and the high bar for 
class certification in federal court, most class plaintiffs opted to pursue 
class actions in state courts.44 In choosing forums in which to file suit, 
                                                                                                                      
41 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 747 (4th Cir. 1989) (approving Dalkon 
Shield 
 (ap-
prov
43 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Mod-
ern 
artz & Christopher E. Appel, Exporting United States Tort Law: The 
Imp
 
litigation class certification), abrogated by Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591 (1997); id. at 727 (“The class action . . . is the manifest fair and expeditious procedure 
for disposing of . . . mass tort litigants.”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 
145, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming certification of the Agent Orange class action). 
42 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 746–48 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
ing a settlement for a class of Vietnam War veterans who alleged injuries caused by 
exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange); Nagareda, supra note 40, at 74–75. In In re 
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, Judge Jack Weinstein, of the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York, certified a mass tort class and “set the litigation on a swift 
schedule for trial with the objective of precipitating serious settlement negotiations.” Na-
gareda, supra note 40, at 74; see In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 746–48. Although Judge 
Weinstein acknowledged that “at best the evidence [was] inconclusive” of a causal relation-
ship between Agent Orange and the plaintiffs’ injuries, he nevertheless facilitated a $180 
million settlement. In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 747; see Nagareda, supra note 40, at 
74. 
Class Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 385–88 (2005) (describing “the short history of 
mass tort class actions”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit started the 
trend in the 1995 case, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., where a class of hemophiliacs alleged 
that a medical products company negligently exposed them to AIDS-infected blood. See 51 
F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner decertified 
the class. Id. Judge Posner explained that certification of mass tort class actions is funda-
mentally unfair to defendants because it creates considerable pressure to settle. Id. He also 
cited concerns of applying the negligence laws of multiple states in one case. Id. Two years 
later, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, dealt a crushing blow to 
the mass tort class action by rejecting a voluntary asbestos settlement. See 521 U.S. at 609–
10. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Court cited the class action’s coercive effect on settle-
ments and the difficulty of applying different states’ tort laws as reasons for decertifying 
the class. See id. at 600. 
44 See Victor E. Schw
ortance of Authenticity, Necessity, and Learning from Our Mistakes, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 551, 
572–73 (2011) (noting that the “explosion of class actions in the 1980s and 1990s” oc-
curred, in part, because “not all states had adopted all of the rules and rational limits that 
are embodied in the federal rule”). Conversely, the Senate Report on the Class Action 
Fairness Act contended that “there are no wide variations between federal and state court 
class action policies,” but that the surge in state court class action filings occurred because 
“some state court judges are less careful than their federal court counterparts about apply-
1854 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1847 
class plaintiffs tried to identify jurisdictions with notoriously favorable 
judges and jury pools.45 Plaintiffs’ “strategic manipulation of forum” 
created magnet jurisdictions which heard disproportionately large 
numbers of class action cases.46 Some relatively unpopulated jurisdic-
tions, such as Madison County, Illinois, and Jefferson County, Texas, 
became poster children for class action critics’ arguments against abu-
sive magnet forums.47 Opponents contended that a small, unrepresen-
tative group of state jurisdictions should not have authority over claims 
with eminently national implications.48 
 Another central critique of class actions concerns the contingency 
fee system.49 In class actions, plaintiffs need not pay their attorneys up 
front; instead, they can voluntarily enter into contingency agreements 
that set aside as attorney’s fees a certain percentage of the settlement or 
judgment should the plaintiffs’ claim succeed.50 The standard contin-
gency fee rate is widely quoted at one-third of the final settlement, but 
is in reality much lower.51 Between 1993 and 2002 the mean fee award 
was 21.9% of the total recovery.52 
 Nevertheless, class action critics repeatedly rallied their constituents 
in opposition to the supposedly out-of-control trial lawyer fees.53 During 
                                                                                                                      
ing the procedural requirements that govern class actions.” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14 
supra note 45, at 1609–10. The American Tort Reform Association pub-
lish  most “plaintiff-friendly” jurisdictions, enti-
tled
, at 14–20, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–21. 
stification of contingency fee agreements is 
that ers through 
the 
ud. 27, 27 (2004). 
ime.” Id. 
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14. 
45 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1593, 1607 (2008). 
46 Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 190. 
47 See Erichson, 
es a well-known annual ranking of America’s
 Judicial Hellholes. See, e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, Judicial Hellholes 2004, at 7 
(2004), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2004.pdf. Dur-
ing the early 2000s, Madison County and Jefferson County were consistently ranked in the 
top five. Id. at 14–18, 25–26. 
48 See Erichson, supra note 45, at 1609–10. 
49 See S. Rep. No. 109-14
50 See Resnik, supra note 37, at 84. One ju
 they “give consumers claiming statutory rights the capacity to attract lawy
potential for large monetary recoveries.” Id. Without this incentive, many lawyers 
would likely spurn class action plaintiffs. Id. Critics contend, however, that contingency fee 
agreements may also encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to artificially inflate the number of class 
members to extract larger settlements. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 184–86 
(discussing attorneys’ attempts to expand class sizes by purporting to represent claimants 
with “substantially different” injuries). 
51 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An 
Empirical Study, 1 J. Empirical Legal St
52 Id. The study also determined that there was “no robust evidence that either recov-
eries for plaintiffs or fees of their attorneys increased over t
53 See, e.g., Remarks at a Victory 2004 Luncheon in New York City, 1 Pub. Papers 630 
(Apr. 20, 2004) (statement of President George W. Bush). 
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h eelection campaign in 2004, for example, President George W. 
Bush strongly criticized plaintiffs’ lawyers and class actions.
is r
egious legal and ethical violations.59 One of the more offensive 
bus
                                                                                                                     
54 In a cam-
paign speech, President Bush sought to “remind the people on Capitol 
Hill you cannot be pro-small business and pro-trial lawyer at the same 
time.”55 Furthermore, the Senate Report on the Class Action Fairness 
Act listed more than six pages of class action settlements in which, it 
contended, lawyers received disproportionate shares of the recovery.56 
This repetitive criticism of class action lawyers proved persuasive.57 A 
2002 study by the American Bar Association on the public’s perception 
of lawyers revealed that sixty-nine percent of respondents believed “law-
yers are more interested in making money than in serving their cli-
ents.”58 
 Certainly, there have been instances of plaintiffs’ lawyers commit-
ting egr
a es by plaintiffs’ lawyers was perpetrated by four managing partners 
of the New York law firm Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach 
(“Milberg Weiss”).60 For two decades, Milberg Weiss was well known in 
corporate circles as one of the largest, most aggressive, and most suc-
cessful securities class action law firms in the country.61 In 2006, how-
ever, the firm was indicted for paying millions of dollars in illegal kick-
backs to three plaintiffs connected to almost 180 cases spanning twenty-
five years.62 These pre-ordered plaintiffs owned shares in hundreds of 
 
w York fundraiser, President Bush called for Congress to 
“rei
 Litig., Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer 
Res lic’s 
perc
.” Id. The results were not broken out by type of lawyer, but 
the 
55. 
56, 158. One partner, David Bershad, was famously accused of keeping a large 
stash  in his office credenza for paying off lead plaintiffs. See Peter Elkind, Mil-
 
54 See id.; Remarks to the National Federation of Independent Businesses, 1 Pub. Pa-
pers 1074–75 ( June 17, 2004). 
55 Remarks to the National Federation of Independent Businesses, supra note 54, at 
1075. In a prior speech at a Ne
gn in the junk and frivolous lawsuits that threaten capital formation” so that the na-
tion’s “great entrepreneurial spirit flourishes.” Remarks at a Victory 2004 Luncheon in 
New York City, supra note 53, at 630. 
56 See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14–20 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–21. 
57 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of
earch Findings 8 (Leo J. Shapiro & Associates eds., 2002) (surveying the pub
eption of attorneys). 
58 Id. Moreover, only thirty-nine percent of respondents agreed that “most lawyers try 
to serve the public interests well
report stated that “consumers found negative things to say about every type of lawyer,” 
including criticizing “personal injury lawyers for chasing ambulances and pursuing frivo-
lous cases.” Id. at 11. 
59 See Peter Elkind, The Law Firm of Hubris, Hypocrisy & Greed, Fortune, Nov. 13, 2006, 
at 154, 156. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 1
62 Id. at 1
 of cash in a safe
1856 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1847 
publicly traded companies.63 When a company’s stock price fell, Mil-
berg Weiss was first in line to file a securities fraud suit.64 The firm’s 
stable of ready and willing plaintiffs helped make the firm’s partners 
incredibly wealthy.65 Ultimately, the firm’s four managing partners were 
sentenced to federal prison for their involvement.66 
 Headline-grabbing abuses like those at Milberg Weiss not only tar-
ish
C. Legislative and Judicial (Over)Reaction 
1. The Class Act
te for class actions and the at-
rn
                                                                                                                     
n ed the reputation of class action lawyers, but also emboldened cor-
porate and political opponents of the class action device itself.67 Instead 
of advocating for greater oversight of the plaintiffs’ bar, class action crit-
ics successfully transformed the public’s negative perception of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers into a movement to curtail severely the class action’s role 
in American courts.68 
ion Fairness Act of 2005 
 In response to growing public distas
to eys behind them, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA) in February 2005 with broad support from both parties.69 
CAFA gives federal courts jurisdiction over class actions based in state 
law in which there is minimal diversity between the parties and the ag-
gregate amount in controversy is over five million dollars.70 Thus, CAFA 
substantially increased defendants’ ability to remove class action cases 
to federal court.71 A 2007 study by the Federal Judicial Center meas-
 
berg Weiss Hits the Canvas, Fortune, Oct. 15, 2007, at 40, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
200
Action, Forbes, Feb. 16, 2004, at 82, 
84 a /2004/0216/082.html. The article contains a 
char  Milberg Weiss settlements of $100 million or more and the firm’s 
cor
1609–10 (discussing class action abuses and 
Con
d as 
ame
discussing Congress’s reasons for enacting CAFA). 
 jurisdiction, 
crea ing and ‘copycat’ cases to be 
 
7/10/01/news/companies/Melvyn_weiss.fortune/. 
63 Elkind, supra note 59, at 160, 163–64. 
64 Id. at 160, 163. 
65 See Robert Lenzner & Emily Lambert, Mr. Class 
vailable at http://www.forbes.com/forbes
t detailing sixteen
responding attorney fees. Id. at 86. 
66 See Elkind, supra note 62, at 40. 
67 See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14–20 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–21. 
68 See Erichson, supra note 45, at 1598, 
gress’s response). 
69 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, (codifie
nded in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14–20, reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–21 (
70 Class Action Fairness Act § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
71 Id.; see S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (“[CAFA] makes it 
harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to ‘game the system’ by trying to defeat diversity
tes efficiencies in the judicial system by allowing overlapp
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ured CAFA’s impact, finding that during the sixteen months after CAFA 
went into effect, the number of diversity class action filings and remov-
als increased in every circuit, and filings at least doubled in seven of 
twelve circuits.72 
 Supporters lauded the bill for bolstering federal courts’ authority 
ver
 the court-
ous
o  class actions.73 They contended that disparate treatment of class 
actions in state courts had inappropriately allowed lawyers to forum 
shop and obtain oversized settlements and fees in certain jurisdic-
tions.74 The bill’s proponents claimed that CAFA would put an end to 
magnet jurisdictions and rein in abusive litigation.75 Indeed, according 
to one commentator, CAFA’s effective prohibition of large class actions 
in state courts and the federal judiciary’s rejection of the mass tort have 
rendered the mass tort class action “dead as a doornail.”76 
 Critics, however, argued that the legislation would close
h e door to potential litigants with legitimate claims.77 They con-
                                                                                                                      
consolidated in a single federal court, [and] places the determination of more interstate 
clas
ions filed monthly in fed-
eral
eral than state court.”). 
discussing class ac-
tion
ederal court.”); Gilles, supra note 43, at 388; supra 
note
st mass tort class actions involve class members from different 
state
mers). Historically, federal courts have been less accepting of plaintiffs’ argu-
men
s action lawsuits in the proper forum—the federal courts.”). 
72 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The Impact of the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts 2–3 (2007), http://www. 
fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0407.pdf/$file/cafa0407.pdf. The study also found a 
substantial increase in the average number of diversity class act
 courts—from 27.0 cases per month prior to CAFA, to 53.4 cases per month after 
CAFA. Id. at 2. 
73 See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5–6. 
74 See id. Researchers have contested the notion of higher fees in state courts. See Ei-
senberg & Miller, supra note 51, at 27 (“Fees as a percent of class recovery were found to 
be higher in fed
75 See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 14, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14 (
 abuse in state courts). 
76 See Erichson, supra note 45, at 1598 (“CAFA ensured that nearly all large-scale class 
actions could be filed in or removed to f
s 38–43 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts’ effective eradication of 
mass tort class actions). Mo
s and an aggregate amount-in-controversy greater than five million dollars. See Class 
Action Fairness Act § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (outlining new requirements for diversity juris-
diction over class actions). A study of class action settlements in federal courts in the wake 
of CAFA found that, of the 688 settlements during 2006 and 2007, “there were almost no 
mass tort class actions . . . settled over the two-year period.” Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 
818–19. 
77 See, e.g., Michael Isaac Miller, Note, The Class Action (Un)Fairness Act of 2005: Could It 
Spell the End of the Multi-State Consumer Class Action?, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 879, 909–29 (2009) 
(discussing two potential legislative alternatives by which to mitigate CAFA’s negative effect 
on consu
ts in class actions than state courts. See Erichson, supra note 45, at 1598; Gilles, supra 
note 43, at 385–88. Because CAFA makes it easier for defendants to remove to federal 
court, the effect is that plaintiffs have a lower chance of succeeding. See Erichson, supra 
note 45, at 1598; Gilles, supra note 43, at 385–88. 
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tended that the reform bill would be more beneficial if it prescribed 
harsh penalties for abusive firms like Milberg Weiss and banned exces-
sive attorney’s fees.78 CAFA, they maintained, was a gift to large corpo-
rations that greatly reduced their liability by shielding them from valid 
claims.79 
2. Case Law Post-CAFA 
 In the time since Congress enacted CAFA, the Supreme Court has 
further limited the class action’s utility.80 The Court’s 2011 decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes considerably raised the bar to entry for 
plaintiffs seeking relief under Rule 23.81 Moreover, the Court’s rulings 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., in 2011 and 2010 respectively, have left many American plain-
tiffs without recourse.82 
a. Employment and Consumer Class Actions: Dukes and Concepcion 
 In the 2011 case, Dukes, the Court overturned a lower court ruling 
certifying a class of 1.5 million women that alleged that Wal-Mart en-
gaged in gender-based employment discrimination.83 The Court con-
cluded that the class was erroneously certified under Rule 23(b)(2) be-
cause the case involved claims for individualized relief that could not be 
satisfied through a single injunction or declaratory judgment.84 Addi-
tionally, five members of the Court, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, held 
that the class could not be certified under any of Rule 23’s other provi-
                                                                                                                      
78 See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. E388 (2005) (statement of Rep. Betty McCollum) (urging 
Congress to adopt a substitute bill that would “put[] an end to ‘coupon settlements’ and 
court shopping” while ensuring that the “class action system [is] accessible and effective”). 
79 See, e.g., William Branigin, Congress Changes Class Action Rules, Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 
2005, 3:55 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32674-2005Feb17.html. 
U.S. Representative Ed Markey, of Massachusetts, described the bill as “the final payback to 
the tobacco industry, to the asbestos industry, to the oil industry, to the chemical industry at 
the expense of ordinary families.” Id. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America derided 
CAFA as “a shameful attack on Americans’ legal rights.” Id. 
80 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 
2888. 
81 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Court-
house Doors, 14 Green Bag 2d 375, 378–80 (2011) (discussing the limiting effect of Dukes). 
82 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. 
83 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
84 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (permitting class actions to be certified only if injunctive 
or declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a whole); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
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sions because the claims lacked sufficient commonality.85 Critics have 
argued that Dukes will make it nearly impossible for groups of legiti-
mately aggrieved employees to collectively litigate employment dis-
crimination claims.86 Indeed, since Dukes, federal courts have applied 
the Court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 23’s commonality require-
ment to deny class certification.87 
 Additionally, in April 2011 the Court decided Concepcion, holding 
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state laws prohibiting 
                                                                                                                     
class action waivers in arbitration provisions of consumer contracts.88 
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that AT&T offered them free cell 
phones in exchange for signing phone service contracts.89 After sign-
ing up for the service, the plaintiffs were charged $30.22 in taxes and 
fees corresponding to the retail price of the “free” phones.90 The plain-
tiffs filed a class action against AT&T, even though their cell phone con-
tracts contained a class arbitration waiver provision.91 Courts in Cali-
fornia and at least twelve other states had prohibited class action 
waivers as unconscionable.92 Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Scalia 
held that the waiver was permissible because the FAA preempted these 
state laws, citing the need for federal uniformity and the efficiency of 
bilateral arbitration.93 
 
85 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57. The dissenters disputed the 
maj
Inc., No. 09-2136, 2011 WL 2650711, at *7 
(N.D
tion of a class action waiver provision is to 
con
jamin Sachs-Michaels, Note, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 
Car
ority’s interpretation of subsection (a)(2)’s commonality requirement. See Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). They argued that by conducting a dissimilarity analy-
sis at the Rule 23(a)(2) stage, the Court rendered Rule 23(b)(3) meaningless. Id. Rule 
23(a)(2) requires commonality, whereas Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions of 
law or fact predominate over questions affecting individual class members such that a class 
action is superior to other methods of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3). 
86 See Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 380. 
87 See, e.g., Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, 
. Cal. July 6, 2011) (“Wal-Mart . . . represents a significant restatement of the com-
monality requirement.”); Lee v. ITT Corp., 275 F.R.D. 318, 325 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (hold-
ing that, in light of Dukes, the plaintiffs’ claims for individualized awards of back wages did 
not satisfy Rule 23’s commonality requirement). 
88 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. The func
tractually limit a consumer’s ability to seek recourse in concert with others—even if all 
members of a group of consumers are similarly aggrieved—and to force resolution of all 
claims by arbitration. Rubenstein, supra note 1, § 6:63. 
89 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744–45. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Ben
dozo J. Conflict Resol. 665, 678--79 (2011) (noting that “the unconscionability of 
class action waivers has been widely recognized in state courts”). 
93 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53. 
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 In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer argued that 
the majority’s decision would have negative effects on potential claim-
ts
 
preme Court has also limited 
the scope of federal law.99 In 
                                                                                                                     
an .94 Justice Breyer maintained that collective redress, whether in arbi-
tration or litigation, protects consumers and holds companies account-
able for large-scale fraud or deception.95 By precluding individuals with 
the same claim from engaging in class arbitration, Justice Breyer con-
tended that the Court’s opinion would result in millions of small-dollar 
claims going unaddressed.96 In Justice Breyer’s opinion, no “rational 
lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation 
for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim.”97 Instead, Jus-
tice Breyer argued, the majority’s holding encouraged corporations to 
circumvent class claims entirely by inserting class arbitration waiver pro-
visions into every consumer contract.98 
b. Securities Fraud Class Actions: Morrison
 In the securities fraud context, the Su
class actions by narrowly re-interpreting 
the 2010 case, Morrison, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the Securities 
Exchange Act so as to prohibit the extraterritorial application of its pri-
vate right of action.100 Morrison involved a foreign-cubed (f-cubed) 
claim—a class of foreign investors brought suit in the United States 
against a foreign corporation in connection with securities transactions 
that occurred on foreign exchanges.101 The plaintiffs sued under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Act, which prohibits “manipulative or deceptive” con-
duct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”102 Sec-
tion 10(b) is the provision under which plaintiffs file the majority of 
 
94 See id. at 1756–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
hold Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 
200 ic alternative to a class action is not [millions of] individual suits, but 
zero
Aug. 30, 2011, 3:35 PM), 
http: .com/2011/08/squeezing-class-actions/ (arguing that “Concepcion  
per
5–77. 
934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); 
Mor 876. 
95 Id. at 1761. 
96 Id. at 1760–61 (quoting Carnegie v. House
4) (“The realist
 individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
97 See id. at 1761. 
98 See id.; Scott Dodson, Squeezing Class Actions, SCOTUSblog (
//www.scotusblog
mits . . . defendants, through private arbitration agreements, to eliminate the class mecha-
nism altogether”). 
99 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (limiting the extraterritorial reach of the Securities 
Exchange Act). 
100 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. 
101 Id. at 287
102 Securities Exchange Act of 1
rison, 130 S. Ct. at 2
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securities class actions.103 The Morrison plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant, National Australia Bank, artificially inflated the price of its or-
dinary stock, thereby causing those who purchased shares on the Aus-
tralian Stock Exchange to incur losses.104 
 Prior to Morrison, federal courts applied a more expansive “con-
duct and effects” test to determine the Securities Exchange Act’s 
reach.105 Under this test, many courts permitted plaintiffs to bring sec-
tion 10(b) claims related to securities listed and sold abroad.106 In Mor-
rison, however, the Court upheld dismissal of the f-cubed class claim, 
finding that Congress intended section 10(b) to apply only “in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock 
exchange.”107 Because the Morrison plaintiffs purchased securities listed 
abroad, their claim did not survive the Court’s new “transactional 
test.”108 The majority expressed concern that the Act’s extraterritorial 
application would unduly interfere with foreign markets and threaten 
international comity.109 It also feared that a permissive reading of sec-
tion 10(b) would further expand class litigation in American courts.110 
 Since Morrison, federal courts have considerably narrowed their 
application of section 10(b), utilizing the transactional test to dismiss 
claims arising out of foreign exchanges.111 In some cases, this reinter-
                                                                                                                      
103 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j); Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class 
Actions § 22:1 (4th ed. 2002). 
ns, J., concurring) (describing the conduct-and-effects test as 
“the
ourts have uniformly agreed that Section 10(b) can apply 
to a  if substantial conduct occurred or substantial effects 
wer
t. 2869 (No. 08-1191))). 
an action thousands 
of m hey had no knowledge of or control over.”). As a result of Morrison, 
how reign plaintiffs may find themselves without relief if their home jurisdictions do 
not 
rities markets.”). 
rs’ section 10(b) suit 
 
104 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
105 See id. at 2889 (Steve
 ‘north star’ of § 10(b) jurisprudence”). 
106 See id. (explaining that “c
 transnational securities fraud”
e felt in the United States (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 15, Morrison, 130 S. C
107 Id. at 2888. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 2885–86; see Monestier, supra note 7, at 74 (“It is arrogant and imperialistic for 
U.S. courts to attempt to bind foreign claimants to a result reached in 
iles away that t
ever, fo
permit class actions. See Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(B)(3) Superiority Requirement 
and Transnational Class Actions: Excluding Foreign Class Members in Favor of European Remedies, 
34 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 7–9 (2011). 
110 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886 (“While there is no reason to believe that the United 
States has become the Barbary Coast for those perpetrating frauds on foreign securities 
markets, some fear that it has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers 
representing those allegedly cheated in foreign secu
111 See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(dismissing a section 10(b) claim by American and foreign plaintiffs arising out of transac-
tions on the Swiss Exchange); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-0922, 2010 WL 
3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (dismissing American investo
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pretation has barred American plaintiffs who purchased securities 
abroad from seeking relief.112 Thus, the Court’s desire to maintain in-
ternational comity has already left many American plaintiffs without 
American remedies.113 In light of Morrison, Concepcion, Dukes, and 
CAFA, some have suggested that “it is not a stretch to wonder if we are 
hearing the death knell of the class action.”114 
II. Rebirth of European Aggregate Litigation 
 For l systems 
tly
describes three recent actions initiated under the Dutch Settlement 
Act.121 
much of the last two hundred years, European lega
fla  rejected the class action.115 Today, however, Europe is increasingly 
willing to look past the real and perceived abuses of the class action de-
vice to obtain its benefits.116 This Part examines Europe’s slow but 
steady acceptance of aggregate litigation.117 Section A discusses 
Europe’s historical rejection of the class action and its traditional criti-
cisms.118 Section B summarizes recent advancements in aggregate litiga-
tion by Member States of the European Union, including the Nether-
lands.119 Section C then outlines two proposals for collective redress 
issued by the governance structure of the EU itself.120 Finally, Section D 
                                                                                                                      
against a foreign corporation because “the Exchange Act was not intended to regulate 
foreign exchanges”); see also Vincent M. Chiappini, Note, How American Are American Deposi-
tary Receipts? ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1795, 1806–12 (2011) (discussing district courts’ reactions to Morrison). 
112 See Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 622. Courts have not limited the transactional test to 
the facts of Morrison—the f-cubed claim—but have restricted f-squared claims brought 
und
]t least some CAFA 
pro c of the Su-
pre
 122–255 and accompanying text. 
 notes 122–136 and accompanying text. 
er section 10(b). See id. In f-squared claims, American plaintiffs have brought suit in 
the United States alleging fraud perpetrated by a foreign company regarding shares listed 
on foreign exchanges. See id.; Chiappini, supra note 111, at 1809 n.117. 
113 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885–86; Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1. 
114 Dodson, supra note 98; see Erichson, supra note 45, at 1602 (“[A
ponents viewed the legislation as a class action death knell.”). One criti
me Court’s recent class action jurisprudence has been more dramatic. See Resnik, supra 
note 37, at 169 (“Do courts in democracies remain legitimate if their doors are shut to 
many potential claimants?”). 
115 See Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. Int’l L.J. 
141, 142–43 (2010). 
116 See id. 
117 See infra notes
118 See infra
119 See infra notes 137–182 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra notes 183–223 and accompanying text. 
121 See infra notes 224–255 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Death of European Collective Litigation?—Familiar Arguments  
Against the Class Action 
 ly 
nin n-
tic.122 America derived  class action from Eng-
nd
presented an entire class of people and could 
ak
As the class action emerged in the United States during the ear
eteenth century, it simultaneously fell out of favor across the Atla
its early notions of the
la , which was largely unique among European countries in permit-
ting collective redress.123 England had recognized some form of group 
litigation as far back as the Middle Ages.124 During the mid-nineteenth 
century, however, England rapidly eliminated group litigation from the 
common law system.125 
 One of the major critiques of group litigation in England at the 
time was its theory of representation.126 In group litigation, one indi-
vidual or association re
m e choices that significantly affected the rights of the other mem-
bers.127 During the early nineteenth century, as England considered 
codifying this common law tradition, the theory of class representation 
generated considerable controversy.128 Despite emerging scholarship 
on the utility of representative litigation, Parliament enacted reforms 
that effectively killed group litigation in England by 1850.129 
                                                                                                                      
122 Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class 
Action 211–13 (1987) (describing the state of group actions in England during the nine-
teenth century). 
123 Id. 
ncern with his proposal was that there was seemingly no end to the the-
ory esentation, to the point that “any interest [could] be represented by anyone 
find ers.” Id. Professor Stephen Yeazell posits that 
the ed an unattractive and difficult project” to 
the 
laintiffs. Michael D. 
Gol  Become the Class Action Capital of Europe—If the U.S. 
Decl at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/ 
Pub
124 See Rubenstein, supra note 1, § 1:12. 
125 See Yeazell, supra note 122, at 210–12. 
126 See Rubenstein, supra note 1, § 1:12. Frederic Calvert, the nineteenth-century legal 
scholar, proposed implementing a representational system. Yeazell, supra note 122, at 
211. The chief co
of repr
ing himself in the same situation as oth
burden of imposing limits “may have seem
Parliamentarians entrusted to implement such a system. Id. at 212. 
127 Yeazell, supra note 122, at 199. 
128 Id.; see supra note 126 (discussing the controversy). 
129 Yeazell, supra note 122, at 211 (explaining that “though group litigation remains to 
this day among the procedures theoretically available to English litigants, it is a device rarely 
employed”). England’s prohibition on contingency fee agreements and its loser-pays princi-
ple traditionally made high-stakes group actions “prohibitively risky” for p
dhaber, Shell Games: Amsterdam Could
ines the Honor, Am. Law., Jan. 7, 2008, at 27, available 
ArticleTAL.jsp?id=900005499991&slreturn=1; see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 
198 (“The contingency fee permits the attorney to fund the litigation and thus overcomes 
the problems of liquidity that may make it impossible for an individual to pursue his rights.”). 
Today, however, England permits the “conditional fee model.” Issacharoff & Miller, supra 
note 6, at 198 n.57. 
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 Since that time, Britain and the rest of Europe have largely viewed 
the American class action with disdain.130 European aversion to Ameri-
can-style class actions has been based on the same arguments espoused 
by the class action’s domestic critics.131 Most troubling to the European 
legal community has been the role of private entrepreneurial law-
yers.132 European legal systems have long relied solely on public au-
thorities to enforce the law, in contrast with the United States, which 
permits lawyers to represent large groups of individuals and assume a 
role of a private attorney general.133 Private enforcement is particularly 
foreign to civil law jurisdictions, which are wary of permitting aggregate 
litigation that would enable “non-state actors to assume the collective 
responsibility . . . traditionally reserved exclusively for the state.”134 Op-
ponents of collective redress argue that introducing such a device in 
Europe could foster a culture of American-style litigiousness.135 Despite 
these critiques, many EU Member States already have or are currently 
considering adopting class mechanisms modeled to some extent on the 
American system.136 
largely by developments in its Member States.138 Many Member States 
have implemented or
B. Aggregate Litigation Mechanisms in European Member States 
 The class action, once “decried as the perversity of rapacious 
Americans,” has started to gain traction throughout Europe.137 The 
EU’s measured acceptance of aggregate litigation has been driven 
 are considering legislation that would permit 
group actions.139 Legislatures in France, Ireland, and Finland, for ex-
                                                                                                                      
130 See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 179. 
131 See id. at 180. 
ra note 115, at 174; see also Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 180 
(no pean countries, a “move away from centralized public enforcement is 
a se
 Yeazell, supra note 122, at 210–11 (explaining how the 
incr
tation on Collective Redress 1–2 (Apr. 2011); see infra notes 206–
207
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). 
ll, supra note 115, at 168–69. 
132 See id. at 191. 
133 See Russell, sup
ting that for Euro
a change in legal structures”). 
134 Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 209. This concern echoes that expressed by 
English legislators in the 1840s. See
easing complexity and enforceability of legislation overtook the need for group litiga-
tion to enforce rights). 
135 E.g., Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 181; U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, 
Response to the Consul
 and accompanying text. 
136 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 21–25 (including Denmark, England and Wales, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, the 
137 Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 179. 
138 See Russell, supra note 115, at 169–70. 
139 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 21–25; Russe
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ample, are currently in the process of developing mechanisms for col-
lective redress.140 Furthermore, several Member States, including the 
Netherlands and Italy, have recently implemented significant legislation 
authorizing aggregate litigation.141 
 Because the European class action is a new and evolving phe-
nomenon, it is difficult to present with certainty a reliable framework of 
any specific country’s laws.142 Indeed, the term “aggregate litigation” is 
 Observers of the developing aggregate litigation mechanisms in 
EU Member States have noted that they “tend to be more circum-
scribed in scope” than Rule 23 in the United States.149 Member States 
                                                                                                                     
itself a more expansive construct than the well-known American-style 
class action.143 Several general characteristics are, however, commonly 
embedded in Member States’ laws.144 These commonalities are in many 
respects responsive to the perceived infirmities of the American sys-
tem.145 They include: (1) a restricted scope or function; (2) an opt-in, 
rather than opt-out, feature; (3) limitations on standing; and (4) a 
modest scheme for damages.146 An outlier from the rest of Europe, the 
Netherlands actually permits mass claims to be brought in various legal 
sectors, requires plaintiffs to opt out of classes, and mandates only a 
loose connection between the alleged injury and the forum.147 As a 
result, the Netherlands may offer plaintiffs—including Americans—a 
more favorable forum in which to bring mass claims.148 
1. Restricted Scope and Function of Aggregate Litigation in Member 
States 
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(“The inconsistent and piecemeal attempts by Member States to introduce collective ac-
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 for settlement purposes, such as the Dutch Settlement Act. See infra notes 149–182 
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States, where class plaintiffs can “pursue da
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typically restrict collective action to certain legal sectors.150 In German
 instan
y, 
for ce, class plaintiffs can only bring claims for financial fraud.151 
Meanwhile, plaintiffs in Italy can bring class actions for damages on a 
broader range of issues, including tortious conduct, unfair commercial 
practices, and anticompetitive practices.152 The Netherlands originally 
intended that its collective redress statute, the 2005 Dutch Act on Col-
lective Settlement of Mass Damages (“Dutch Settlement Act”), apply 
only to mass tort claims.153 Today, however, the Netherlands no longer 
enforces this limitation, and Dutch courts have confirmed class settle-
ments in both securities and products liability actions.154 
 Additionally, some Member States permit claim aggregation for 
limited functions like settlement.155 In the Netherlands, for example, 
the Dutch Settlement Act does not permit full adjudication of claims 
and lacks coercive authority to force settlement.156 Instead, the Act pro-
vides for judicial approval and validation of voluntary out-of-court set-
157tlements.  In reviewing settlements, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                      
150 See id. at 48. 
151 Nagareda, supra note 7, at 23–24. 
152 See Roald Nashi, Note, Italy’s Class Action Experiment, 43 Cornell Int’l L.J. 147, 154 
(2010). Observers have noted that “the Italian experiment is a significant advance” that 
comes close “to a full-blown, American-style class action.” Id. at 150. Still, the Italian system 
has not yet been thoroughly tested in court, and thus its similarity to the American system 
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 Settlement Act to an arbitration mechanism). One scholar has compared the Dutch 
Sett
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Rv bk. 3, tit. 14, arts. 1013–18. 
154 See Ianika N. Tzankova, Professor, Tilburg University, Presentation at the Fourth In-
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://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Transnational%20
Litigation%20Dutch%20Developments.pdf. 
155 See Murtagh, supra note 109, at 36–39 (describing the Dutch Settlement Act in de-
tail). 
156 See id. at 36–37. Plaintiffs in the Netherlands ca
s under the Dutch Civil Code, but may only seek injunctive relief. See van der Heijden, 
supra note 153, at 14. Such collective actions are sometimes “considered as a springboard” 
to a settlement under the Dutch Settlement Act. Id. at 5. Thus, although the Dutch Settle-
ment Act is not itself a coercive mechanism, class plaintiffs can sue or threaten to sue un
der the Dutch Civil Code to facilitate a settlem
157 See van der Heijden, supra note 153, at 14 (noting that some observers compare the 
Dutch
lement Act’s settlement certification process to the voluntary mass tort settlement in 
the 1997 case Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, which the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately 
rejected. Nagareda, supra note 7, at 32 (“One might say that the Dutch procedure brings 
about a full-scale Amchem-ization of aggregate litigation, casting it exclusively as an avenue 
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can only entertain arguments on “the substantive and procedural fair-
ness and efficiency of the settlement.”158 
2. The Opt-In vs. Opt-Out Debate 
 Rather than requiring individu
is required under Rule 23 in the Un
als to opt out of a proposed class as 
ited States, Member States generally 
s the class, subject to certification 
by a court.165 The Netherlands is a notable adherent to the American 
model, and, under the Dutch Settlement Act, permits class members to 
     
require class members to opt in.159 Instead of enabling litigation, most 
European aggregate litigation devices prioritize closure.160 An opt-in 
mechanism requires each member of the class to affirmatively join the 
proceeding.161 This ensures smaller classes and facilitates swift resolu-
tion of claims, but also necessarily reduces access to courts.162 Italy’s 
class action statute, for example, provides a 120-day period following 
receipt of notice of the suit during which potential claimants may opt 
in.163 Although this provides for peremptory closure of class actions, it 
may also undercut the ability of potential claimants to participate in 
suits in which they have legitimate claims.164 
 In contrast, some Member States follow the American opt-out 
model, in which class counsel define
                                                                                                                 
for peacemaking . . . .”); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600 (1997); 
supra note 43 (discussing Amchem). 
158 Murtagh, supra note 109, at 37. 
159 See Monestier, supra note 7, at 48; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth the U.S. 
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160 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 28 (“[O]ne might say that Europe seeks to strike a 
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164 Id. (explaining that the original draf
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ntiff partic
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tended that the opt-in systems in Europe are judicially inefficient. See, e.g., Rachael 
Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 409, 448–50 (2009) (noting “the utility of an opt-out re-
gime for . . . low-value claims”). 
165 Nagareda, supra note 7, at 21, 24–25 (noting that Denmark (Danish Class Action 
Act), the Netherlands (Dutch Settlement Act), and Norway (Mediation and Civil Proce-
dure Act) all permit opt-out aggregate claims). 
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opt out.166 There, as in the United States, the parties must provide no-
tice of the claim to all similarly injured persons.167 If the court approves 
a settlement, the agreement is automatically binding on all injured par-
ties, except for those who have opted out.168 Because actual opt-outs 
are few, plaintiffs’ lawyers sometimes propose overly inclusive classes in 
hopes of certifying a larger class, increasing access to courts, and gar-
nering a larger settlement.169 Regardless, the Netherlands’ opt-out sys-
tem remains an anomaly in Europe.170 
3. Organizational Standing 
 Member States also tend to restrict standing in aggregate claims to 
organizations or foundations, denying standing to individuals.171 For 
, only a foundation or association may act 
d class to negotiate a settlement with the 
ffe
                                                                                                                     
example, in the Netherlands
in the interests of the injure
o nding party.172 The members of the class who are represented by 
the foundation, however, need only a loose affiliation with the forum to 
initiate a claim.173 Because such organizations must be authorized by 
the state, some critics have noted that this model could be abused if 
only a select few organizations are authorized as representatives.174 In 
contrast, Italy’s recently revised class action statute addressed this issue, 
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167 Murtagh, supra note 109, at 36–37. 
168 Id.; see Monestier, supra note 7, at 52 n.17
lement Act by which judgments issued by American courts are reviewed and enforced 
in the Netherlands). 
169 Nagareda, supra note 7, at 29. 
170 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 30 (“
tion in Europe . . . .”); Russell, supra note 115, at 177. 
171 See Monestier, supra note 7, at 48. 
172 Murtagh, supr
ms in the Netherlands, in Auf dem W
tthias Casper et al. eds., 2009) (“The law does not require consumers to become a 
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 associations.”), available at http://ssr
173 van Lith, supra note 9, at 33–34; see infra notes 264–273 and accompanying text. 
174 van Boom, supra note 172, at 179–80; see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 194 
(noting that the interests of a consumer organization and the individual claimants it repre-
sents may not always align); Nashi, supra note 152, at 168 (“The potential for collusive set-
tlement is increased where the consumer organization is not just a 
 player in the litigation and settlement of a type of claim.”). 
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and now permits individual consumers, as well as representative or-
ganizations, to initiate aggregate claims.175 
4. Limits on Damages 
 Lastly, Member St
plaintiffs and their atto
ates tend to limit windfall recoveries for both 
rneys to a far greater extent than the United 
ate
                                  
St s.176 Many states restrict the amount of damages a class can obtain 
to the amount of the actual loss, or do not permit court awarded dam-
ages at all.177 In the Netherlands, courts cannot actually award damages 
in class claims.178 Instead, they can issue injunctive relief under the 
Dutch Civil Code or, under the Dutch Settlement Act, issue declaratory 
judgments certifying out-of-court settlements between parties.179 As 
both plaintiffs and defendants must jointly petition the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals to approve the settlement, the Act assumes that the 
parties will reach an equitable accounting of damages and attorney’s 
fees.180 The Italian model is again more robust.181 It offers a complete 
range of court-prescribed damages in a similar fashion to the United 
States.182 
                                                                                    
175 Nashi, supra note 152, at 169. 
176 See Monestier, supra note 7, at 48. 
177 See id. at 47. 
178 See Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 
86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 313, 357 (2011) (noting that under the Dutch Settlement Act, 
“the threat of a damages class action . . . is unavailable”). 
179 See van Boom, supra note 172, at 178 (describing the Dutch Settlement Act’s certifi-
cation mechanism as “a composite of a voluntary settlement contract sealed with a ‘judicial 
trust mark’ attached to the contract”). 
180 See BW bk. 7, art. 907(3)(b) (stating that the Amsterdam Court of Appeals will not 
certify a settlement if “the amount of the compensation awarded is not reasonable”); Was-
serman, supra note 178, at 357–58 (discussing settlement under the Dutch Settlement Act). 
181 Nashi, supra note 152, at 151. 
182 Id. (“This development moves Italy’s private enforcement mechanism away from its 
continental counterparts and closer to the American-style class action system under Rule 
23 . . . .”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Although Europe has traditionally rejected contingency fee 
agreements, some member states—particularly those with collective litigation schemes—
have begun to permit such agreements because they are an effective means of litigation 
funding. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 197–202. Both Italy and Germany, for 
example, repealed their bans on contingency fee agreements in 2006. Id. at 198 (Ger-
many); Nashi, supra note 152, at 162 (Italy). 
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C. Guidance from the European Union: Proposals for a Trans-European  
System of Collective Redress 
 On a macro level, the EU has made strides in the past decade to 
study, support, and implement procedures for collective redress.183 
These policies have focused on improving the remedies available to 
those damaged by infringements of the European Community’s (EC) 
competition laws.184 This Section describes two major policy initiatives 
by Europe’s supranational government.185 First, it summarizes the Eu-
ropean Commission’s 2008 White Paper on collective damages ac-
tions.186 Second, it outlines the proposals contained in the European 
Parliament’s 2012 Resolution, Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress.187 
1. Commission White Paper on Mass Damages Actions 
 In 2008, the Commission of the European Communities (“Com-
mission”) published the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules (“White Paper”), which recommended using aggregate 
litigation to adjudicate mass claims of antitrust infringement.188 The 
White Paper recognized two main benefits of aggregate litigation— 
compensation and deterrence—but prioritized the former over the 
latter.189 Europe continues to rely heavily on public regulatory agencies 
to monitor and deter underhanded corporate conduct, and is hesitant 
to shift deterrence responsibility to private actors.190 Therefore, the 
White Paper’s proposals were calculated to “create an effective system of 
private enforcement by means of damages actions that complements, 
but does not replace or jeopardise, public enforcement.”191 
                                                                                                                      
183 See Russell, supra note 115, at 169–71. 
184 See Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules, at 3, 
COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter White Paper]; Russell, supra note 115, at 
169–71 (discussing the Commission’s prior studies of collective redress). 
185 See infra notes 188–223 and accompanying text. 
186 See infra notes 188–202 and accompanying text. 
187 See infra notes 203–223 and accompanying text. 
188 White Paper, supra note 184, at 2–3. 
189 Id. at 3 (“Full compensation is . . . the first and foremost guiding principle.”); see 
Russell, supra note 115, at 175 (discussing the dual benefits). 
190 White Paper, supra note 184, at 2–3. (“[T]he legal framework for more effective anti-
trust damages actions should be based on a genuinely European approach.”); see Nagareda, 
supra note 7, at 3 (noting that some critics view American litigiousness “as the regrettable 
byproduct of a deep cultural hostility to the kind of robust bureaucratic administration by 
public regulatory bodies embraced in Europe”). 
191 White Paper, supra note 184, at 3. 
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 The White Paper suggested three limitations on aggregate antitrust 
litigation that significantly distinguish the envisioned European system 
from the American model.192 First, the Commission recommended 
representative actions brought by qualified entities rather than individ-
ual plaintiffs.193 This is similar to the organizational standing require-
ment under the Dutch Settlement Act.194 Qualified entities, which 
could include trade and consumer associations as well as government 
agencies, could either be certified for particular actions or approved in 
advance for all potential claims.195 
 Second, the White Paper proposed an opt-in model of collective re-
dress in which claimants must affirmatively join the class.196 In an opt-in 
system, qualified entities would be able to advocate on behalf of “identi-
fied,” rather than simply “identifiable,” victims.197 The Commission in-
tended the opt-in rule to prohibit class attorneys from artificially inflat-
ing class sizes so as to obtain larger judgments.198 As the White Paper 
made clear, however, “any individual” with a valid antitrust infringe-
ment claim would still be entitled to file an individual action even if 
they failed to opt into the class.199 
 Third, the White Paper recommended that damages in antitrust in-
fringement claims be limited to the amount of actual losses the plain-
tiffs suffered, including lost profits.200 Even though the Commission 
prioritized the compensatory function of aggregate litigation, it was 
intent on prohibiting “the unjust enrichment of the victims.”201 The 
Commission’s central goal was to simplify, accelerate, and expand the 
                                                                                                                      
192 See id. at 4–10. 
193 Id. at 4. 
194 See BW bk. 7, art. 907(1) (requiring settlement to be negotiated by a foundation or 
association); White Paper, supra note 184, at 4; Murtagh, supra note 109 at 37. 
195 White Paper, supra note 184, at 4. 
196 Id. As noted in Part II.B.2, most of the Member States that have accepted aggregate 
litigation have also chosen the opt-in model. See supra notes 159–170 and accompanying 
text. 
197 See White Paper, supra note 184, at 4. The White Paper leaves open the possibility of 
representing identifiable victims in “restricted cases.” Id.; see Issacharoff & Miller, supra 
note 6, at 202 (contrasting the opt-in model with the American opt-out scheme, “under 
which it is possible for a class member to be a part of a lawsuit and suffer a preclusive 
judgment without any knowledge”). 
198 See White Paper, supra note 184, at 4. 
199 See id. 
200 Id. at 7. The White Paper notes the Commission’s intention to provide further 
guidance for calculating damages. Id. 
201 Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, at 58, SEC (2008) 404 final (Apr. 2, 2008); see White Paper, 
supra note 184, at 7. 
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process by which parties aggrieved by violations of the EC antitrust 
rules could collect reasonable damages.202 
2. Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress 
 Recent developments in the European Parliament have brought 
the EU closer than ever to adopting a trans-European scheme for col-
lective litigation.203 In February 2011, the European Commission began 
to solicit public consultation on a proposal entitled Towards a Coherent 
European Approach to Collective Redress.204 The Commission received over 
three hundred submissions from national governments, trade organiza-
tions, businesses (including law firms), and citizens from thirty-one 
countries around the world.205 The responses were unsurprising: gov-
ernments, consumer organizations, and citizens overwhelmingly fa-
vored new mechanisms for aggregate litigation to protect consumers,206 
while the majority of businesses and corporate law firms argued against 
such change.207 
                                                                                                                      
202 White Paper, supra note 184, at 3. 
203 See Resolution, supra note 7, at 36–43; Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 1–30. 
204 Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Seeks Opinions on the Future for 
Collective Actions in Europe (Feb. 4, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
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Public Consultations: Towards a Coherent European Approach on Collective Redress, Eur. Commis-
sion (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Consultation Website], http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html (containing the responses to the 
Commission’s Consultation). 
205 See Burkhard Hess, Evaluation of Contributions to the Public Consultation 
and Hearing: “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress” 3 
(2011) (summarizing responses), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_ 
collective_redress/study_heidelberg_summary_en.pdf. 
206 See, e.g., European Competition Lawyers’ Forum, Comments of the European Compe-
tition Lawyer’s Forum on the Commission Staff Working Document 1–2 (Apr. 2011) (advo-
cating for a broader application of collective redress to areas outside competition law); Nat’l 
Consumer Agency of Ireland, Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress 
3 (Apr. 2011) (“A collective remedy . . . would go some way towards addressing the current 
shortcomings.”); UK Competition Law Ass’n, Response to European Commission’s Consulta-
tion on Collective Redress 1–13 (Apr. 2011). All responses are available on the Consultation 
Website. See Consultation Website, supra note 204. 
207 See Hess, supra note 205, at 5 (noting that opponents argued that “there is no conclu-
sive evidence of an enforcement deficit”); Consultation Website, supra note 204. The Commis-
sion received twelve submissions from the United States. See Consultation Website, supra note 
204. Several major American law firms, including Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 
and Covington & Burling LLP, submitted comments disfavoring collective redress. See id. 
(providing responses of Skadden and Covington & Burling). The Institute for Legal Reform, 
a branch of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, also submitted a strongly-worded response 
arguing, somewhat ironically, against reform. See U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, supra 
note 135, at 1–2. 
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 In January 2012, after considering the submissions to the Commis-
sion’s consultation, the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (“Com- 
mittee”) issued a report (“Legal Affairs Report”) containing recommenda-
tions should the Commission pursue a harmonized system of collective 
redress.208 The Committee prefaced its Report by explaining that, in the 
near term, it was not convinced of the need for a trans-European rem-
edy.209 Moreover, the Committee questioned whether it was within the 
bounds of the Parliament’s supranational governing authority to man-
date such a reform.210 Nevertheless, the Legal Affairs Report acknowl-
edged that aggregate litigation could be “in the interest of victims of 
unlawful behaviour” who wish “to bundle their claims which they would 
not otherwise pursue individually.”211 
 Despite the Committee’s hesitance to endorse EU action, the rec-
ommendations in its Report formed the basis of a Resolution adopted by 
the Parliament on February 2, 2012.212 In an effort to combat forum 
shopping, for example, the Resolution strongly urged that a trans-
European mechanism for collective redress be available for all types of 
legal claims.213 This was a marked departure from the White Paper, 
which proposed limiting collective redress to competition and antitrust 
claims.214 Without a comprehensive and harmonized cross-border 
scheme, the Resolution contended, plaintiffs would aggressively forum 
shop between Member States’ individual aggregate litigation laws.215 
                                                                                                                      
 
208 Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 11. In addition to the Committee on Legal Af-
fairs’ recommendations, the Legal Affairs Report also contains the Opinions issued by the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on the Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection. See id. at 17–30. 
209 Id. at 11 (“[T]he Commission has so far failed to show the need for EU action.”). 
210 Id. at 5 (noting that “the Commission must respect the principles of subsidiarity 
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the European Union arts. 101–102, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88–89 (delineating 
parameters of the Commission’s and the Parliament’s governing authority with respect to 
competition law). Moreover, the French and German submissions to the consultation also 
cast doubts on whether Member States would actually adhere to a trans-European regime. 
See Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 11 n.2. 
211 Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 11. It also noted that, by consolidating individ-
ual claims into one action, thereby “bringing legal certainty to the matter,” aggregate liti-
gation could appeal to defendants as well. Id. 
212 Resolution, supra note 7, at 36–43; Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 11–16. 
213 Resolution, supra note 7, at 40 (stating that any procedural mechanism “must apply 
to collective redress actions in general irrespective of the sector concerned”). 
214 Compare id. (suggesting the broad application of collective redress), with White Paper, 
supra note 184, at 3 (proposing a system narrowly tailored to competition claims). 
215 See Resolution, supra note 7, at 40. The Resolution stated that such a “fragmentation 
of national procedural and damages laws” would necessarily “weaken and not strengthen 
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Therefore, the Resolution insisted that any trans-European solution 
regulate both procedure and damages for all cross-border mass ac-
tions.216 
 The Resolution stressed that “Europe must refrain from introduc-
ing a US-style class action system,” and many of its suggestions differed 
considerably from the American system.217 For example, the Resolution 
called for the Commission to adopt an opt-in class model that permits 
aggrieved plaintiffs to file suit individually if they decline to join an ag-
gregate claim.218 Like the White Paper, the Resolution would prohibit 
punitive damages and explained that monetary damages must not ex-
ceed the actual injury sustained.219 It also rejected contingency fees as 
incompatible with Europe’s traditional legal payment system.220 
 Additionally, in its Legal Affairs Report, the Committee recom-
mended that jurisdiction in class claims be limited to the court of the 
Member State in which the defendant is domiciled.221 The Report also 
suggested implementing a €2000 cap on the claims individuals can pur-
sue in aggregate adjudication.222 This recommendation implicitly rec-
ognized one of the central benefits of collective redress: it enables 
plaintiffs with small individual claims, but large claims in the aggregate, 
to efficiently seek remedies in court.223 
                                                                                                                      
access to justice within the EU.” Id. Nevertheless, the Resolution was actually largely sup-
portive of the aggregate litigation mechanisms introduced in individual Member States. See 
id. at 38. 
216 Id. at 40. 
217 Id. at 38. In fact, the Resolution cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes as a positive example of American courts combating the “frivo-
lous litigation and . . . abuse” that Europe must also prohibit. Id.; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). 
218 Resolution, supra note 7, at 40. The Resolution explained that an opt-out mechanism 
would be “contrary to many Member States’ legal orders and violates the rights of any 
victims who might participate in the procedure unknowingly and yet be bound by the 
court’s decision.” Id. at 41. 
219 See id. at 41 (“[P]unitive damages must be prohibited.”). 
220 Id. 
221 Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 16. The Parliament Resolution proposed that 
“Brussels I should be taken as a starting point for determining . . . jurisdiction.” Resolution, 
supra note 7, at 43. 
222 See Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 13. This recommendation is in conformity 
with the 2007 EC Regulation on small claims procedure. See Regulation 861/07, Establish-
ing a European Small Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1 (EC). 
223 See Resolution, supra note 7, at 37; Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 13. In his dissent 
in the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Justice Stephen 
Breyer acknowledged the same benefit. 131 S. Ct. at 1760–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra 
notes 94–98 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer’s Concepcion dissent). 
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D. Trans-Atlantic Securities Actions and the Dutch Settlement Act 
 In spite of the recent proposals by the European Commission and 
Parliament for a trans-European scheme for collective redress, the EU 
has not yet acted.224 Instead, Member States have continued to develop 
disparate systems for mass actions.225 Because they are so new and have 
not been thoroughly interpreted by national courts, the impact of these 
laws is yet unknown.226 
 In the Netherlands, however, multinational plaintiff classes have 
extensively used the Dutch Civil Code and the Dutch Settlement Act to 
resolve their disputes.227 The Netherlands’ opt-out scheme, broad ju-
risdictional reach, and permissive damages and attorney’s fee rules 
have made it particularly attractive for plaintiffs resolving class dis-
putes.228 As one observer has noted, “the backdrop for the new trans-
Atlantic . . . aggregate litigation” will be formed by “[t]he trading of 
securities on multiple markets.”229 Unsurprisingly, then, most of the 
transnational collective settlements thus far considered in the Nether-
lands have been securities claims.230 
                                                                                                                     
1. Shell Settlement 
 In May 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals approved a $352 
million securities fraud settlement against Royal Dutch/Shell Petro-
leum (“Shell”).231 This was the first transnational securities fraud settle-
 
 
224 See Resolution, supra note 7, at 36–43; S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European 
Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 2013) (manuscript at 75), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123608. 
225 Russell, supra note 115, at 180 (explaining that “the process of legal and procedural 
harmonization” of aggregate litigation throughout Europe “will be long, complex, and the 
outcome is as yet uncertain”). 
226 Monestier, supra note 7, at 49 (“[A]ggregate litigation procedures . . . have not yet 
been fully ‘road tested.’”); Russell, supra note 115, at 173 (explaining that the overall im-
pact of these statutes will depend on “the way regulations are interpreted and legal stan-
dards are applied by the courts”). 
227 See van der Heijden, supra note 153, at 1. 
228 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 41. Although the Netherlands is an attractive destina-
tion for class settlements, Professor Richard Nagareda explains that it remains to be seen 
“whether Amsterdam ultimately will emerge . . . as a kind of procedural ‘red-light district’ 
for aggregate dealmaking, like its namesake for other transactions pursued by consenting 
parties.” Id. 
229 Id. at 32. 
230 See Tzankova, supra note 154, at 8–9. Interestingly, the Dutch Settlement Act actu-
ally evolved out of negotiations to establish a unified compensation scheme for a class of 
cancer patients. See van Boom, supra note 172, at 177–78. 
231 Gerechtshof [Hof] [Court of Appeals] Amsterdam May 29, 2009, no. 106.010.887, 
(Shell Petroleum N.V./Dexia Bank Nederland N.V.) (Neth.) (sworn translation), at 60–61, 
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ment validated under the Dutch Settlement Act.232 In Shell, an interna-
tional class of plaintiffs sued Royal Dutch/Shell in 2004 in the United 
States, alleging that the company violated federal securities law by over-
stating its petroleum and natural gas reserves.233 While the U.S. case 
was pending, the Netherlands enacted the Dutch Settlement Act.234 
Royal Dutch/Shell, which is domiciled in the Netherlands, and the 
class’s non-American plaintiffs agreed to negotiate a settlement under 
the new statute.235 The non-American class, represented by the Sticht-
ing Shell Reserves Compensation Foundation, included institutional 
and individual investors from seventeen European countries, as well as 
Canada and Australia.236 
 In 2007, the parties reached a provisional settlement agreement, 
which the Amsterdam Court of Appeals approved two years later.237 By 
approving the Shell settlement, the court firmly established the Dutch 
Settlement Act’s broad extraterritorial scope.238 Since Shell, the Act’s 
international reach has expanded further.239 
2. Converium/SCOR Settlement 
 One recent ruling by the Amsterdam Court of Appeals demon-
strates the Dutch Settlement Act’s transnational utility.240 On January 
                                                                                                                      
 
available at https://www.royaldutchshellsettlement.com/Documents/English-JudgmentTrans- 
lation2009.pdf. 
232 Id.; van der Heijden, supra note 153, at 10. 
233 In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515–16 (D.N.J. 2005). 
234 See id.; Goldhaber, supra note 129, at 24. 
235 See Settlement Agreement at 3, Hof Amsterdam Apr. 11, 2007, (Shell Reserves Com-
pensation Foundation/Shell Petroleum N.V.), available at https://www.royaldutchshellset- 
tlement.com/Documents/Settlement%20Agreement.pdf. 
236 List of Registered Participants, Stichting Shell Reserves Compensation Found. 24–
31 (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.shellsettlement.com/docs/List%20of%20Participants.pdf. 
237 See Hof Amsterdam, (Shell Petroleum N.V. /Dexia Bank Nederland N.V.) at 60–61; 
Settlement Agreement, supra note 235, at 1–3. Before petitioning the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals to approve the settlement, the parties waited for the U.S. court to decline jurisdic-
tion over the non-American plaintiffs. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. 
Supp. 2d 712, 724 (D.N.J. 2007) (holding that the court did not have subject matter juris-
diction over the non-U.S. purchasers); Goldhaber, supra note 129, at 24. 
238 See Hof Amsterdam, (Shell Petroleum N.V./Dexia Bank Nederland N.V.) at 30–34 
(discussing international jurisdiction); van der Heijden, supra note 153, at 10. 
239 See infra notes 240–255 and accompanying text (discussing Converium/SCOR and 
Fortis/Ageas). 
240 See Gerechtshof [Hof] [Court of Appeals] Amsterdam Jan. 17, 2012, no. 200. 
070.039/01, (SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG/Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG) (Neth.) 
(unofficial translation), at 11–12, available at http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/ 
9/media.1139.pdf; Press Release, Spector Roseman Kodroff & Willis, P.C., In Landmark Rul-
ing, Dutch Court of Appeals Approves Settlements in the Converium/SCOR Securities Class 
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17, 2012, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals confirmed a transnational 
settlement agreement in the Converium/SCOR case.241 The class, which 
consisted of both American and European investors, initially filed suit 
in U.S. federal district court under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.242 In a 2008 ruling in In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG 
Litigation, however, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York excluded from the suit the foreign class members who pur-
chased shares on the Swiss Exchange.243 
 As a result, the omitted European investors commenced settle-
ment talks with Converium in the Netherlands.244 Three American 
plaintiffs’ law firms represented the class in these negotiations.245 Ulti-
mately, the parties reached a $58.4 million settlement, which included a 
combined twenty percent fee for the plaintiffs’ attorneys.246 Pursuant to 
its authority under the Dutch Settlement Act, the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals certified the Converium/SCOR settlement.247 
3. Fortis/Ageas Securities Class Action 
 In a recent groundbreaking development, American investors for 
the first time utilized the Dutch Settlement Act in an attempt to resolve 
a securities fraud claim.248 On January 10, 2011, a global class of inves-
tors filed a class action against Fortis, a defunct financial services com-
                                                                                                                      
Action ( Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2012011800 
6723/en/Landmark-Ruling-Dutch-Court-Appeal-Approves-Settlements. 
241 Hof Amsterdam, (SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG/Liechtensteinische Landes-
bank AG), at 6. 
242 In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011). 
243 In re SCOR Holding, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59. 
244 Hof Amsterdam, (SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG/Liechtensteinische Landes-
bank AG), at 4–5. As a result of the pending suit in the United States, American investors 
were explicitly excluded from settlement negotiations in the Netherlands. See id. at 4 (de-
scribing a separate settlement in federal district court for American investors). 
245 Id. at 7. The three plaintiffs’ firms were Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann 
LLP, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, and Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C. Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 11–12. 
248 See Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb.] Utrecht Jan. 10, 2011, (Stichting Investor Claims 
Against Fortis Foundation/Ageas N.V.) (Neth.) (writ of petitioners) (unofficial translation), 
at 1, available at http://www.investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/Attachment/191_English%20 
translation%20of%20Writ%20(00028785).PDF. 
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pany, in Utrecht Civil Court.249 The claim alleged that Fortis misrepre-
sented both its holdings of subprime mortgage-backed securities and its 
growing debt.250 Plaintiffs contended that, as a result of the company’s 
actions, Fortis’s investors lost hundreds of millions of euros.251 The 
plaintiffs filed suit under the Dutch Civil Code in an effort to win a de-
claratory judgment against Fortis; the plaintiffs intended to use the suit 
and potential judgment to force Fortis to settle for monetary damages 
under the Dutch Settlement Act.252 Although the class consisted mostly 
of institutional investors from Europe, it also included Americans.253 
Notably, as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the claimants would have been 
barred from bringing suit in the United States because they purchased 
Fortis securities on European exchanges.254 Thus, the Fortis/Ageas ac-
tion may signal a new opportunity for American claimants seeking re-
dress against European defendants in class litigation.255 
III. Go East, Young Man: The Potential of Emerging Legal 
Markets for American Plaintiffs 
 In crafting new legal mechanisms for collective redress, the EU’s 
Member States have been keenly aware of the familiar critiques of 
American class litigation—mass settlements, large attorney’s fees, ag-
                                                                                                                      
249 Id. Due to the Netherlands’ standing requirements, a specifically incorporated 
foundation, the Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis, represented the individual class 
members. See id. at 2–3. 
250 See David Bario, Dutch Treat? With Doors to U.S. Courts Closed by Morrison, Securities 
Class Action Lawyers Sue Fortis in Holland, Am. Law. Litig. Daily ( Jan. 10, 2011), http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/tal/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202477589137&Dutch_Treat_With_Doors_to_US 
_Courts_Closed_by_Morrison_Securities_Class_Action_Lawyers_Sue_Fortis_in_Holland. 
251 Rb. Utrecht, (Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis Foundation/Ageas N.V.) 
(writ of petitioners), at 47–49. 
252 See id. at 4–5; Bario, supra note 250. 
253 Bario, supra note 250. The American class action firms Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. and 
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (formerly Barroway Topaz) represent the class’s Ameri-
can plaintiffs. Id. 
254 Rb. Utrecht, (Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis Foundation/Ageas N.V.) (writ of 
petitioners), at 3; see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010) (adopting 
a transactional test for securities fraud claims); Mark Cobley, US Investors Are Under-Compensated 
and Over Here, Fin. News ( Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/ 2011-01-11/ 
us-investors-dutch-class-actions; supra notes 99–214 and accompanying text. 
255 See Rb. Utrecht, (Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis Foundation/Ageas N.V.) 
(writ of petitioners), at 2–3. This claim is still pending before the court in Utrecht. See id. 
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gressive lawyers, and magnet jurisdictions.256 Some reformers have 
been confident that in Europe, “the American entrepreneurial ways . . . 
will be resisted fully, in much the same way that Europe has held off the 
unwelcome presence of McDonald’s or Starbucks in its elegant piaz-
zas.”257 Indeed, with opt-in actions and limits on standing and damages, 
European legislatures have consciously fashioned aggregate litigation 
schemes distinct from the American model.258 
 Despite European efforts to craft a subdued class action regime, 
opportunities for American plaintiffs endure.259 There is, after all, a 
McDonald’s in Rome’s Piazza di Spagna and a Starbucks on Paris’s 
Champs-Élysées.260 This Part argues that American class plaintiffs— 
whose access to domestic courts has been stripped away by legislative 
and judicial decree—should take advantage of Europe’s new legal 
structures.261 Section A contends that American victims of securities 
fraud relating to transactions on foreign exchanges should seek relief 
under the Dutch Settlement Act.262 Then, Section B analyzes the po-
tentially negative consequences for American plaintiffs in the event that 
the EU enacts a trans-European collective redress system.263 
A. American Plaintiffs Should Use the Dutch Settlement Act 
1. The How: Amsterdam’s Far-Reaching Jurisdiction 
 The Dutch Settlement Act holds potential for American plaintiffs 
because of its extensive jurisdictional scope.264 Under the Dutch Code 
of Civil Procedure, Dutch courts can assert jurisdiction over non-
European parties as long as at least one petitioner or interested party is 
                                                                                                                      
256 See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 6, at 181–91; id. at 191 (“Each of the controver-
sies in American practice returns to the issue of the incentives operating on lawyers who 
will predictably push the boundaries of the system.”). 
257 Id. at 180. 
258 See Monestier, supra note 7, at 44; supra notes 137–182 and accompanying text. 
259 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 7. 
260 See Loren Jenkins, Eternal City Gets Pair of Golden Arches, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1986, 
at E3; Arcades Champs Elysees, Starbucks Coffee Company, http://www.starbucks.fr/ 
store/50974/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
261 See infra notes 264–332 and accompanying text; see also Goldhaber, supra note 129, 
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262 See infra notes 264–305 and accompanying text. 
263 See infra notes 306–332 and accompanying text. 
264 See BW bk. 7, art. 907(1); van der Heijden, supra note 153, at 11. 
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domiciled in the Netherlands.265 In claims under the Dutch Settlement 
Act, this condition is particularly easy to fulfill because of the Act’s 
standing requirement.266 The Dutch Settlement Act explicitly mandates 
that individual claimants be represented by a representative foundation 
that is domiciled in the Netherlands.267 Thus, even though the claim-
ants in the Shell settlement were from nineteen countries, they were 
sufficiently connected to the Netherlands because they were repre-
sented by a Dutch foundation.268 Additionally, the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals may assert jurisdiction even if the Netherlands is substantially 
unconnected to the underlying fraud.269 In the Converium/SCOR set-
tlement, for example, the court maintained jurisdiction even though 
the alleged fraud related to purchases and sales of securities on the 
Swiss Exchange.270 
 Moreover, because the Dutch Settlement Act requires all parties to 
petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeals for a declaration to validate 
the out-of-court settlement, it is highly unlikely that any defendant 
would object.271 Defendants have an interest in ensuring that the Neth-
erlands has jurisdiction because, as a result of the Dutch Settlement 
Act’s opt-out scheme, its binding settlements have preclusive effect and 
create finality.272 Unsurprisingly, no party has ever challenged the Am-
                                                                                                                      
265 Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [Rv] [Code of Civil Procedure] bk. 1, tit. 
1, art. 3, translated in Code of Civil Procedure, Brecht’s Dutch Civil Law, http://www.dutch 
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dence in the Netherlands . . . .”); van Lith, supra note 9, at 33; van der Heijden, supra 
note 153, at 11. 
266 See Rv bk. 3, tit. 14, art. 1014 (requiring claimants to be represented by “[a] founda-
tion or association”); van Lith, supra note 9, at 34. 
267 van Lith, supra note 9, at 34. 
268 Id. at 33–34; see Gerechtshof [Hof] [Court of Appeals] Amsterdam May 29, 2009, no. 
106.010.887, (Shell Petroleum N.V./Dexia Bank Nederland N.V.) (Neth.) (sworn transla-
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270 See Hof Amsterdam Jan. 17, 2012, no. 200.070.039/01, (SCOR Holding (Switzer-
land) AG/Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG) (Neth.) (unofficial translation), at 4, avail-
able at http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/9/media.1139.pdf. 
271 See BW bk. 7, art. 907; van der Heijden, supra note 153, at 10. 
272 See van Lith, supra note 9, at 34 (noting that “[t]he alleged responsible party has 
an interest in binding as many foreign interested parties as possible to build critical mass 
for adhesion of representative parties to the settlement and to minimize individual dam-
age actions abroad”). 
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sterdam Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction under the Dutch Settlement 
Act.273 
2. The Who: American Securities Fraud Class Action Plaintiffs 
 American plaintiffs should use the Dutch Settlement Act for secu-
rities class actions related to foreign-listed securities.274 As a result of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 reinterpretation of section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 
American investors who are defrauded on their purchases of foreign 
securities on foreign exchanges can no longer seek relief in American 
courts.275 Thus, in an age in which Americans purchase more foreign-
issued securities than ever before, millions of investors are without re-
course at home.276 The Dutch Settlement Act presents a real opportu-
nity for individual and institutional investors to find relief.277 
 Until now, the only Americans to have sought collective redress in 
the Netherlands have been institutional investors.278 Going forward, 
however, American plaintiffs’ firms are positioned in Europe to facili-
tate access to Dutch courts for less sophisticated, small-claim plain-
tiffs.279 Indeed, U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers began expanding across the At-
lantic prior to Morrison, intent on attracting European class members to 
join ongoing securities fraud suits in the United States.280 One Ameri-
can attorney representing plaintiffs in the Fortis/Ageas claim explained 
that his firm’s American “clients are increasingly looking to forums 
where they’re going to be able to receive compensation for their non-
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275 See 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010); supra notes 99–114 and accompanying text. 
276 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury et al., Report on U.S. 
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278 See Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb.] Utrecht Jan. 10, 2011, (Stichting Investor Claims 
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Milstein Hausfeld & Toll PLLC. Id.; Nagareda, supra note 7, at 5. 
280 See Nagareda, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
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U.S. losses.”281 Thus, in the aftermath of Morrison, firms have viewed 
Europe as a lucrative new avenue for growth and have continued to 
expand there.282 Plaintiffs’ firms have incentive to make potential 
American plaintiffs aware of European opportunities and to make it 
easy to join these settlements.283 The recent involvement by American 
plaintiffs’ firms in aggregate settlements in the Netherlands shows the 
potential of Europe for American plaintiffs with small claims.284 
3. The Issue: Will U.S. Courts Enforce Dutch Settlements? 
 The Netherlands’ expansive jurisdictional reach will only benefit 
American plaintiffs if the settlements approved under the Dutch Set-
tlement Act are respected and given res judicata effect by American 
courts.285 Because the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not apply to judgments rendered by foreign courts, enforce-
ment in the United States is not guaranteed.286 Instead, parties with 
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bank AG), at 6; Rb. Utrecht, (Stichting Investor Claims Against Fortis Foundation/Ageas 
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difficult to predict whether a judgment will be recognized abroad.”). See generally Mon-
estier, supra note 7 (analyzing res judicata in the sphere of transnational class actions). In 
EU Member States, the Brussels I Regulation simplifies the enforceability determination 
for foreign legal judgments. See Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 33–34, 38, 
41, 2000 O.J. (L12) 1 (EC). The Regulation requires all Member States to honor and en-
force legal judgments from other members. See id. As a result, the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals technically labels its decisions under the Dutch Settlement Act as “judgments,” 
instead of “declarations.” See van Lith, supra note 9, at 125. 
286 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
. . . judicial Proceedings of every other State . . . .”); Jaffe v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 294 
F.3d 584, 591 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Neither the full faith and credit statute, nor the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of the Constitution, applies to judgments issued from foreign coun-
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foreign judgments who want to collect on them in the United States 
must petition an American court to recognize and enforce the judg-
ment.287 American courts typically recognize foreign judgments that 
satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of international comity.288 
Courts may, however, still decline to recognize judgments “rendered 
under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or 
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law” or 
based in claims “repugnant to the public policy of the state or the Unit-
ed States.”289 
 Securities fraud settlements approved under the Dutch Settlement 
Act should be enforceable in the United States because the Nether-
lands provides sufficient due process.290 The Act requires class mem-
bers to be notified of the settlement and permits them to opt out.291 
The Act also mandates that both parties to the out-of-court settlement 
petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to make the agreement bind-
                                                                                                                      
tries.”); Robert L. McFarland, Federalism, Finality, and Foreign Judgments: Examining the ALI 
Judgments Project’s Proposed Federal Foreign Judgments Statute, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 63, 71 
(2010) (explaining that foreign judgments are not self-executing in part because of “the 
potential abusive practice of foreign, forum-shopping plaintiffs who secure judgments on 
the basis of foreign laws that impair the rights of citizens of the U.S.”). 
287 See Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act [hereinafter 
FCMJRA] (2005), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/library/archives/ulc/ufmjra/2005 
final.pdf; Montré D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1159, 1166–70 (2007) (discussing recognition of foreign judgments in U.S. 
courts). Although most foreign judgment recognition cases are heard in federal courts, “the 
force and effect of foreign judgments are matters of state law.” McFarland, supra note 286, at 
84; see Carodine, supra, at 1191. To date, thirty-three states have enacted the FCMJRA or its 
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Fact Sheet—Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Nat’l Conf. of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet. 
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Oct. 25, 2012). 
288 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). In the 1895 case Hilton v. Guyot, 
the U.S. Supreme Court defined comity as “the recognition which one nation allows within 
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due re-
gard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Id. Today, the principle of comity 
is embedded in the FCMJRA; states that have not adopted the FCMJRA have incorporated 
the principle of comity into their common law. See FCMJRA § 4(b)–(c); Carodine, supra 
note 287, at 1167–68. 
289 FCMJRA § 4(b)(1), (c)(3); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 
2002) (noting that foreign procedures must comport with the spirit but not the letter of 
American due process). 
290 See WCAM, codified in BW bk. 7, arts. 907–10 and Rv bk. 3, tit. 14, arts. 1013–18; Soc’y 
of Lloyds, 303 F.3d at 330. 
291 Rv bk. 3, tit. 14, art. 1013(5). 
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ing.292 Additionally, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals may not certify a 
settlement under the Act unless it determines that the interests of the 
parties were adequately safeguarded, the plaintiff foundation was “suf-
ficiently representative” of its members interests, and the settlement 
amount was reasonable.293 Of course, U.S. courts may be concerned 
with preclusive opt-out foreign judgments that, if given res judicata ef-
fect in the United States, would bind all American class members.294 
Nevertheless, because federal courts have foreclosed the possibility of 
recovery for foreign securities transactions under U.S. law—thereby 
denying due process entirely—courts should respect settlements pro-
cured by proactive Americans who seek relief abroad.295 
 Moreover, securities settlements under the Dutch Settlement Act 
do not conflict with American public policy.296 In fact, the United States 
provides a private right of action for securities fraud under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.297 Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Morrison declined to provide relief for fraud related to foreign 
transactions, the Court justified its limitation of section 10(b)’s extra-
territorial application as necessary because “the regulation of other 
countries often differs from ours.”298 Thus, the application of foreign 
laws to foreign transactions actually supports the Court’s policy, and U.S. 
courts should recognize and enforce such foreign judgments.299 Securi-
ties fraud class settlements related to transactions on foreign exchanges 
in which American plaintiffs assert rights similar to those protected by 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act should be enforceable in 
the United States.300 
 The Dutch Settlement Act is not, however, a panacea for all of the 
recent class action restrictions in the United States.301 Although U.S. 
courts should give preclusive effect to foreign securities fraud judg-
ments, they are not likely to extend such preclusion to other judgments 
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based on claims that are contrary to U.S. public policy.302 For example, 
American plaintiffs should not expect U.S. courts to enforce consumer 
class settlements based on contracts that included express class litiga-
tion or arbitration waiver provisions; as the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
the 2011 case AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, class arbitration is in-
consistent with U.S. law.303 Similarly, U.S. courts would not likely honor 
a settlement for a large-scale employment discrimination claim; as the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in the 2011 case Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
such a claim would fail Rule 23’s commonality requirement.304 Never-
theless, in mass damage securities fraud claims, Americans can use the 
Dutch mechanism to their advantage.305 
B. A Harmonized European Remedy Would Harm American Plaintiffs 
 The diffusive state of collective redress in EU Member States is 
beneficial to American plaintiffs.306 Even after the recommendations in 
the Commission’s 2008 White Paper and the Parliament’s 2012 Resolu-
tion, substantial differences persist between Member States’ class 
mechanisms.307 The lack of European uniformity has created exploit-
able nuances between Member States’ conceptions of aggregate litiga-
tion.308 As shown in Section A of this Part, in the absence of a harmo-
nized trans-European system, American plaintiffs can take advantage of 
the Netherlands’ Dutch Settlement Act.309 In analyzing American pros-
pects for collective redress in Europe, however, a major unanswered 
question is whether, and to what extent, the EU will act on the recent 
proposals for a trans-European aggregate device.310 
 In its response to the Commission’s 2011 consultation, the Nether-
lands urged the EU not to create a separate system for cross-border 
                                                                                                                      
302 See id.; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
303 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51; supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text. 
304 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
305 See BW bk. 7, art. 907; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. 
306 See Russell, supra note 115, at 169–70 (discussing Member States’ “inconsistent and 
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308 See Monestier, supra note 7, at 49. 
309 See supra notes 264–305 and accompanying text. 
310 See Russell, supra note 115, at 169–70 (describing the uncertainty regarding aggre-
gate litigation currently permeating the EU); S.I. Strong, supra note 224, at 75 (contend-
ing that “it appears highly likely that the procedures outlined in the Resolution will ulti-
mately result in a new [trans-]European [system of collective redress]”). 
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class adjudication.311 Instead, the Netherlands advocated for a sort of 
European federalism.312 It suggested that the EU encourage Member 
States to develop their own systems of collective redress, and to provide 
Member States with guidelines for best practices.313 The Netherlands 
argued that although coordination across borders is important, indi-
vidual Member States should be free to develop their own mechanisms 
for collective redress “without being harmonised.”314 Thus, it recom-
mended that the Commission “use soft law to ensure a greater degree 
of coherence.”315 This coordinated, but not harmonized, approach 
would “create a level playing field” but also recognize that “[o]ne size 
does not fit all.”316 
 Nevertheless, after considering the Netherlands’ response, the 
2012 Parliament Resolution emphatically stressed the need to harmo-
nize Member States’ aggregate litigation laws so as to reduce plaintiffs’ 
incentives to seek remedies in particular national jurisdictions.317 Pro-
ponents of harmonization have contended that the differences be-
tween the collective redress mechanisms of the EU’s twenty-seven 
Member States could be substantial.318 As a result, there is a chance 
that “the substantive law of one state—perhaps an outlier—effectively 
will govern” aggregate settlements throughout the entire continent.319 
Currently, to the benefit of American plaintiffs, that “outlier” is the 
Netherlands’ Dutch Settlement Act.320 
                                                                                                                      
311 Kingdom of the Neth., Dutch Response to the Public Consultation on a Coherent Eu-
ropean Framework for Collective Redress 7–8 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter Dutch Response] 
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315 Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
316 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
317 Resolution, supra note 7, at 39–40 (stressing the need for horizontal uniformity 
across Member States); Legal Affairs Report, supra note 7, at 15 (“[Q]uestions of jurisdiction 
and the applicable law are of the utmost importance in order to prevent forum shop-
ping.”); see Dutch Response, supra note 311, at 7–8. 
318 See Resolution, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
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 Accordingly, a harmonized European system could significantly 
reduce American plaintiffs’ access to Dutch courts.321 If the EU pre-
empts its Member States’ laws and imposes a system based on the spe-
cific recommendations outlined in the Legal Affairs Report, the Dutch 
Settlement Act’s utility would be considerably decreased.322 For exam-
ple, the Legal Affairs Report proposed that only the court of the Member 
State in which the defendant is domiciled should have jurisdiction over 
class claims.323 This bright-line rule is considerably narrower than the 
jurisdictional scope of the Dutch Settlement Act, and would insulate 
defendants from liability.324 Defendants domiciled outside the EU 
would thus be immune from securities fraud class actions even if they 
sold securities on European exchanges and thereby injured European 
investors.325 Americans who purchased those fraudulent securities 
abroad would, of course, be without recourse in the United States as a 
result of Morrison.326 
 Beyond these concerns, the Legal Affairs Report also proposed a 
€2000 cap on individual claims brought under the aggregate device.327 
This restriction contrasts starkly with the Dutch Settlement Act, which 
permits both individual and institutional investors to have their settle-
ments approved by the Amsterdam Court of Appeals.328 If the Report’s 
recommendation were enforced throughout the continent, plaintiffs 
and defendants alike would be impacted significantly.329 A cap on indi-
vidual damages would ensure that only plaintiffs with claims that could 
be inefficient and expensive to bring on an individual basis would seek 
class redress.330 This would seriously alter securities class actions in 
which large institutions, pension funds, and wealthy private investors 
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are frequently claimants.331 Eliminating large claimants from the class 
could also reduce the class’s ability to pay litigation expenses and de-
crease lawyers’ incentive to represent the class at all.332 
Conclusion 
 American class plaintiffs who are shut out of domestic courts 
should seek relief in Europe under the Dutch Settlement Act. In the 
United States, recent legislative and judicial restrictions on class certifi-
cation have narrowed the class action’s utility, particularly in securities 
fraud cases. Simultaneously, across the Atlantic, the EU and its Member 
States have proposed and implemented aggregate litigation schemes. In 
the Netherlands, the Dutch Settlement Act provides American plaintiffs 
with a limited but powerful opportunity to redress securities fraud 
claims related to foreign transactions. Although not a cure-all for Amer-
ican plaintiffs, and though it may be preempted in the future by a har-
monized, trans-European system for collective redress, the Dutch Set-
tlement Act is currently a viable alternative to U.S. federal courts for 
resolving securities fraud disputes. 
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